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PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN MARITIME LAW: A COURT'S
REFUSAL TO IMPOSE LIABILITY ON A MANUFACTURER
FOR FAILURE TO WARN OF POST-SALE DEFECTS
WHERE THE INJURY SUFFERED
WAS PURELY ECONOMIC
KATHARINE LAVALLEY*
A A GENERAL rule, tort claims for post-sale negligence
against manufacturers, such as failure to warn of known de-
fects, are barred when the injury caused is purely economic.'
The United States Supreme Court extended the purely-eco-
nomic loss rule into the context of maritime law in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., holding that "a man-
ufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either
negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a prod-
uct from injuring itself."2 Despite this apparently broad hold-
ing, lower courts across the country are split regarding the
existence of an exception to the East River doctrine for a manu-
facturer's failure to warn of post-sale defects.' In Bouttee v. ERA
Helicopters, L.L. C., the Western District of Louisiana explicitly re-
fused to find an exception for a manufacturer's post-sale failure
to warn of known defects in the product, holding that the East
River doctrine served as a general bar to tort recovery for purely
economic loss.4 The court erred in refusing to acknowledge an
exception for post-sale negligence by failing to: 1) recognize the
distinction between a defect during the product's manufacture
and failure to warn of a defect discovered after the product's
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2009; B.A., the University of Texas at Austin, 2005. The author would like to
thank her fiance, John Kane, for his unconditional love and understanding, and
her parents, Liz and Jerry Lavalley, for a lifetime of support and encouragement.
I 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1914 (2007).
2 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986).
3 See, e.g., Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Eurocopter Deutschland,
GMBH, No. G-06-438, 2007 WL 2446787, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007).
4 Bouttee v. ERA Helicopters, L.L.C., 244 F.R.D. 360, 368 (W.D. La. 2007).
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manufacture; 2) adhere to Fifth Circuit precedent; and 3) rec-
ognize that the policy issues inherent in the failure to warn con-
text are best handled by tort law.
On May 13, 2006, a pilot employed by ERA Helicopters,
L.L.C. ("ERA") was transporting a passenger, Boutte,5 over the
Gulf of Mexico in a helicopter manufactured by Eurocopter. a
During the journey, an engine malfunction forced the ERA pilot
to make an emergency landing in the Gulf of Mexico.' Though
the emergency water landing was successful, the helicopter
rolled and inverted during the rescue team's attempts to recover
it from the water.' The total submersion of the helicopter in salt
water completely destroyed the helicopter, rendering it a total
loss.9 The engine that caused the malfunction and subsequent
emergency landing was manufactured by Turbomeca USA, Inc.
("Turbomeca") .1
Boutte brought suit against Turbomeca, Eurocopter, and ERA
for alleged damages from injuries resulting from the accident.11
Subsequently, ERA sent a demand letter to Turbomeca and
Eurocopter ("the Manufacturers") stating that "because the inci-
dent was caused by a defect in the engine, [the Manufacturers]
were liable for the loss of the helicopter."1 2 After unsuccessful
negotiations between the parties, Turbomeca sought declaratory
judgment that ERA's claim against the Manufacturers was
barred by the East River purely economic loss doctrine, since
ERA was only seeking to recover for the loss of the helicopter. 3
In response, ERA requested that the court recognize an excep-
tion to the East River doctrine for post-sale negligence. 14
The Western District of Louisiana declined to recognize the
suggested exception, holding that ERA's claim for damages
against the Manufacturers was barred by East River.15 The court
5 Apparently, the plaintiffs name is misspelled in either the case name or the
decision ("Bouttee" versus "Boutte"). Id. at 361.
6 Id. at 362.





12 Id. at 362.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 364-66. ERA alleged that the Manufacturers were negligent in failing
to monitor the reliability of the engines and failing to publish data regarding
maintenance and repair of the engine. Id. at 366.
15 Id. at 368.
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based this conclusion on its determination that East River oper-
ates as a complete bar to recovery against all tort claims for
purely economic loss. 16 Thus, because a manufacturer has no
duty to prevent a product from injuring itself, no tort claim (in-
cluding post-sale negligence) is viable where the loss suffered is
purely economic. 7
The court began its legal analysis by noting that neither the
United States Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has expressly
decided whether the reasoning of East River allows for an excep-
tion for post-sale negligence.' 8 However, the court acknowl-
edged that the Fifth Circuit, in Nicor Supply Ships Associates v.
General Motors Corp., "did not preclude the possibility" of the ex-
istence of a post-sale negligence exception to the East River doc-
trine. 9 After stating the absence of any controlling precedent,
the court noted that the Third Circuit was the only federal cir-
cuit court to reach the issue 20 and applied the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. General Electric Co.21
In Sea-Land, a ship owner brought a tort claim against the
manufacturer of the ship's diesel engine for damages arising as
a result of the engine's failure.22 The ship owner's claim for
purely economic loss rested on the theory that the manufac-
turer had failed to warn him of a defect in its engine which the
manufacturer became aware of after the engine's sale. 2' Re-
jecting the ship owner's claim, the Third Circuit noted that East
River "enunciated an unconditional bar for all tort recovery for
economic loss arising out of a defective product. ' 24 Further, the
court noted that the plaintiff in a post-sale negligence action is
left with all available contractual remedies, which are better
suited to resolve the issue than tort remedies.25
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 367.
19 Id. at 368 (citing Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 876 F.2d
501 (5th Cir. 1989)).
20 Id. at 367.
21 Id. (citing Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 134 F.3d 149 (3d Cir.
1998)).
22 Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 134 F.3d at 151.
23 Id. at 155.
24 Id.
25 Id. (noting "the reason for [the East River rule] is that the parties to such a
bargain can set the terms of their expectations through negotiations, contract
provisions, price adjustments, and insurance" and "[i]f either party deems it ad-
visable to require warning of a known defect in order to protect the product, that
2008]
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Adopting the Third Circuit's reasoning in Sea-Land, the Bout-
tee court ultimately based its holding on two factors. First, like
the Third Circuit in Sea-Land, the court determined that East
River's "unequivocated" holding that a manufacturer in a com-
mercial relationship has no duty to prevent a product from in-
juring only itself was "directly applicable. ' 26 Thus, according to
the Bouttee court, East River serves as a "broad, unadulterated bar
precluding all negligence claims for economic loss arising out of
damages to a defective product. '27 Second, the court adopted
the Third Circuit's reasoning in Sea Land that "[t] he policy of
economic loss is better adjusted by contract rules than by tort
principles." 28
The Bouttee court erred in its refusal to acknowledge an excep-
tion to the East River doctrine for a manufacturer's post-sale neg-
ligence. First, the Fifth Circuit, whose precedent is controlling
on the Bouttee court, recognized the existence of the post-sale
negligence exception in Nicor Supply Ships Association v. General
Motors Corp.29 Second, the court wrongly concluded that the
United States Supreme Court intended East River to operate as a
bar against all tort claims where the loss suffered was purely eco-
nomic. Third, the court wrongly concluded that contract reme-
dies are better suited to resolve the issue of a manufacturer's
post-sale duty to warn.
First, the court's conclusion that the Fifth Circuit has never
recognized an exception to the East River doctrine for post-sale
negligence is inaccurate. 30 In fact, the Fifth Circuit's plain lan-
guage explicitly recognized an exception in Nicor Supply Ships."
In Nicor, the Fifth Circuit analyzed two pre-East River decisions
32
that distinguished between a manufacturer's negligence during
the manufacturing process and a manufacturer's failure to warn
party can negotiate for such a provision or can protect against a defect through
insurance").
26 Bouttee, 244 F.R.D. at 368; Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 134 F.3d at 155.
27 Boutee, 244 F.R.D. at 368.
28 Id. at 367.
29 Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir.
1989).
30 Before East River was decided in 1986, the Fifth Circuit allowed for tort re-
covery in maritime law for purely economic injury caused by a product to itself.
Jig the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171,
175-76 (5th Cir. 1975).
31 Nicor Supply Ships, 876 F.2d at 504.
32 Id. (citing Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 646 F. Supp. 1520 (D.N.J.
1986); McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813 (1lth Cir. 1984)).
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of a known defect after the product's sale." The Fifth Circuit
concluded that both of these courts found that a purchaser may
sue in tort for a manufacturer's post-sale negligence as long as
two elements are satisfied: "the manufacturer has 'discovered
[the defect] after the engine was already on the market,' and
'the warranty does not expressly disclaim negligence.' ,34 After
applying these two elements to the Nicor facts, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that "the contract between General Motors and
Nicor expressly disclaimed General Motors' liability for negli-
gence arising out of the purchase of the engine. ' 35 Thus, be-
cause the plaintiff had failed to prove both elements, the Fifth
Circuit stated that "Nicor's claim does not fall into the possible
exception to East River carved out by the Miller Industries and
McConnell courts. 36
In its analysis of Nicor, the Bouttee court recognized only that
"in Nicor, the Fifth Circuit did not preclude the possibility of the
existence of a post-sale negligence exception. '37 However, the
court's interpretation of Nicor is inaccurate. In Nicor, the Fifth
Circuit analyzed cases adopting the post-sale negligence excep-
tion, recognized and applied a two-part test to determine
whether a particular plaintiff fell within the exception, and de-
termined that the plaintiff in that case failed to prove the ele-
ments.3 8 The application of the two elements to the facts in the
case served as the Fifth Circuit's implicit recognition of the exis-
tence of the exception in cases where the two elements are met.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's language referring to a "possible" ex-
ception to East River referred not to the possibility of the existence
of the exception, but instead to the potential that a particular
plaintiff might adduce enough evidence to meet the two elements.3 9
The court's next error was its interpretation that East River
completely bars all tort recovery where the injury suffered was





37 Bouttee v. ERA Helicopters, L.L.C., 244 F.R.D. 360, 368 (W.D. La. 2007)
(emphasis added).
38 Nicor Supply Ships, 876 F.2d at 504.
39 In Bouttee, it is unclear from the facts as presented whether the plaintiff ad-
duced enough evidence to meet the two elements of the Nicor test. First, the facts
do not show whether the warranty expressly disclaimed liability for negligence;
second, the facts do not show whether the Manufacturers were aware of the de-
fect in the engine. See Bouttee, 244 F.R.D. at 361-62.
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and was not intended to, bar all types of tort claims for purely
economic loss; it was merely intended to bar those tort claims
that are also recoverable under contract law.40 The Supreme
Court's intention to bar only tort claims that are additionally
recoverable under contract law is stated in its explanation of the
irrelevance of the nature of the malfunction causing the
accident:
Either way, since by definition no person or other property is
damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the
harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-
like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value,
and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to re-
ceive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of
contract law.4"
The Supreme Court's intention is further illustrated by its
statement that if products liability actions were taken too far,
"contract law would drown in a sea of tort."4 2 Thus, the Su-
preme Court in East River did not intend to bar tort claims for
purely economic loss that are not recoverable under contract
law.
Claims for post-sale negligence, especially failure to warn, are
not covered by contract principles. As ERA argued, the East
River doctrine does not bar claims for post-sale negligence, and
particularly post-sale failure to warn of a known defect, "because
the parties to the sale of the defective product did not negotiate
for and set the terms of their expectations. '43 Thus, since post-
sale failure to warn claims, such as those alleged by ERA against
the Manufacturers, are not recoverable under contract law, a
correct application of East River establishes that those claims are
not barred by the doctrine.44
The court's final error is its contention that post-sale negli-
gence should be handled by contract rather than tort principles.
The Bouttee court adopted the reasoning that "we, as a society,
40 Id. at 368.
41 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986).
42 Id. at 866.
43 Bouttee, 244 F.R.D. at 368.
44 As stated by the Eleventh Circuit:
Whatever the merits of adopting a rule that views defects in a prod-
uct as part of the parties' bargain and thus within the law of sales, it
is much less tenable to presume that the buyer has bargained away
the manufacturer's obligation to warn of defects that later come to
the manufacturer's attention.
Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 818 (11th Cir. 1984).
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should attempt to provide every incentive for a manufacturer
with knowledge that a defective product is on the market to
warn its customers. ' 45 However, in refusing to allow a tort claim
for a manufacturer's post-sale negligence where only economic
injury is suffered, the court incorrectly required a product to
injure a person or other property before the manufacturer has
an incentive to warn purchasers of post-sale defects. Had the
court acknowledged an exception for post-sale negligence
where only economic loss is suffered, it would have provided
"every incentive for a manufacturer with knowledge that a defec-
tive product is on the market to warn its customers."46 In sum,
the court's holding is directly contradictory to the principles
adopted to support it.4 7
Though contract principles sufficiently regulate a buyer's ex-
pectations of the product at the time of sale, they are inade-
quate to ensure that the manufacturer will continue to ensure
the safety of its product after the sale. However, ensuring a
product's continued safety by imposing tort penalties on the
manufacturer is one of the primary goals of tort law. Thus, the
court erred in failing to distinguish a manufacturer's negligence
during the development of the product from a manufacturer's
negligence in failing to inform a purchaser of possible defects
after the sale. ERA correctly argued that a purchaser should
have a tort claim against a manufacturer in cases of post-sale
negligence, especially post-sale failure to warn, because a manu-
facturer's negligence after manufacture has been completed
"goes not to the quality of the product that the buyer expects
from the bargain, but to the type of conduct which tort law gov-
erns as matter of social and public policy. 4 8
In Bouttee v. ERA Helicopters, L.L. C., the Western District of
Louisiana held that there was no exception to the East River doc-
trine for a manufacturer's post-sale failure to warn of known de-
fects in the product because East River served as a general bar to
45 Bouttee, 244 F.R.D. at 367.
46 See id.
47 Arguably, the Fifth Circuit has previously indicated its belief that tort poli-
cies and principles should always govern a manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn.
SeeJig the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171,
175-76 (5th Cir. 1975). In adopting the reasoning of Jig the Third and finding a
tort duty to warn of post-sale defects even where only economic loss is suffered,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that the former Fifth Circuit explicitly "rejected, at
least in the maritime context, such a rigid separation of the law of sales and the
law of torts." Miller Indus., 733 F.2d at 817.
48 Id.
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tort recovery for purely economic loss. The court's conclusion
is incorrect because it fails to adhere to Fifth Circuit precedent,
misinterprets the breadth of the Supreme Court's holding in
East River, and fails to distinguish between the applicability of
tort principles to pre- and post-sale negligence. For these rea-
sons, the court should have allowed an exception to the East
River doctrine for a manufacturer's post-sale failure to warn
where the only injury suffered was economic.
